The Russian Federation is currently the most heavily sanctioned country in the world, with over 80% of measures levied after the invasion of Ukraine in 2022. This significant increase has forced the Kremlin to find sanction-proof revenue streams in a relatively short timeframe. In doing so, Russia has effectively fused its economic, intelligence, and security interests into one overarching hybrid strategy. Russia’s “shadow fleet” clearly exemplifies this shift, whereby improperly flagged and ambiguously owned vessels are used to transit illicit Russian oil to global markets, generating significant revenue to fuel the war against Ukraine. While traditionally viewed in Ottawa as a sanctions enforcement issue, the subversive nature of these irregular vessels increasingly poses a security threat to North Atlantic allies. As Russian ships transit the Northern Sea Route at an unprecedented rate, and disagreements within NATO about how to handle these vessels makes the development of a clear response mechanism difficult, it is imperative for Canada to view the shadow fleet as a key aspect of its maritime security.
In early 2026, the United States Coast Guard intercepted ‘M/V Bella 1’, a sanctioned Russian oil tanker transiting international waters near Iceland, while lurking Russian Naval vessels spectated from afar. In the following days, two more Russian oil tankers attempted to cross the English Channel, a critical maritime artery, spurring the British Navy to deploy a monitoring ship. These acts were the result of political calculation, intended to test the reaction of the West and create divisions between allies. Russia is acutely aware that the bold and somewhat confrontational maritime stance of the U.S. and U.K. is not mirrored by the European Union, which prefers a non-escalatory and diplomatic approach. In essence, by sailing oil tankers through a major shipping route just days after the dramatic seizure of Bella 1, Moscow set the agenda for disagreement between NATO allies on how to approach sanctioned Russian vessels.
This is illustrative of Russia’s hybrid doctrine, utilizing unconventional and indirect methods to advance its interests without the use of force. In the maritime domain especially, there is a lack of homogeneity amongst states on the enforcement of coastal laws, which differ domestically and exist under the broader and similarly complex frameworks of international law. The key vulnerability for NATO is not the recognition of this maritime threat; it is the complexity of operational planning that establishes deterrence and satisfies the conflicting maritime interests of its member states. Moreover, the fusion of Russia’s military, economic, and political interests makes it more difficult for allies to immediately understand the nature of its actions, ultimately providing Moscow a level of ambiguity. For example, vessels associated with the shadow fleet frequently transit the Baltic Sea and have engaged in the sabotage of undersea infrastructure. The global flow of information predominantly takes place underwater, while a significant amount of liquefied natural gas (LNG) is transported to market via undersea pipelines. The ability for Russia to interfere with this infrastructure presents a dual economic and security risk.
NATO has responded with “Operation Baltic Sentry”, a coordinated effort to enhance its ability to “detect threats” by using a series of small aircraft, maritime drones, and frigates – ultimately “[responding] if necessary”. It is worth considering the extent to which Baltic Sentry sends a message of deterrence to the Kremlin or a signal of NATO’s efficacy to its domestic audiences. The operational ability of NATO to respond to a Russian vessel flagged under a tertiary country and suspected of malfeasance at sea remains the key challenge. European allies may oppose escalated naval confrontation that could result in miscalculation from either side, ultimately sparking a greater conflict. In the past, both Russia and the UK have proven willing to deploy naval vessels to monitor transits and spectate seizures. However, the risk aversion of European states can create disconnect within the alliance, ultimately weakening its deterrent effect at sea.
For Canada, these uncertainties necessitate a focus on the security implications of the shadow fleet, especially as Russian vessels transit the Northern Sea Route (NSR) at an alarming rate. In 2025, it is estimated that 100 ships transited the NSR on behalf of Moscow, a more than seven-times increase from 2024. While Canada has recently expanded its sanctioning of the shadow fleet to include 100 more ships, Ottawa continues to view the issue through an economic lens. As the extraction of oil and gas increases in the North Sea and potentially the Arctic, Russia’s ability to tamper with and interrupt undersea infrastructure poses a clear security threat to Canada. Russian oil tankers also serve as a conduit for intelligence operations, transporting human assets and mapping critical undersea arteries. In 2025, for instance, French authorities boarded the ship ‘Boracay’ and discovered two individuals tied to the Wagner Group – a Russian mercenary entity. The presence of intelligence operators on shadow vessels exemplifies Russia’s ability to “shape the environment” against an adversary, exploiting gaps in response strategies to maximise the impact of subversive acts.
This raises questions over the extent to which Canada will tolerate Russian intelligence operations in its waters, notably when it comes to the mapping of undersea infrastructure, which in a potential conflict could seriously harm both domestic infrastructure and economic wellbeing. While Canada has joined European and Nordic allies in the “Shadow Fleet Task Force”, a coordinated deterrence and disruption mechanism, there is still much to be desired when it comes to operational strategy. According to Global Affairs Canada, “[the Task Force] will continue to advance our modalities for swift information-sharing to inform our sanctions development and other policy responses.” The key policy response left unclear, however, is how Canada will enforce its maritime security in the face of the shadow fleet and its intentional ambiguity. Jurisdictionally, Ottawa needs to pre-emptively decide how it will address these challenges to avoid the operational indecision Moscow’s ambiguous fleet seeks to manufacture.
Canada has taken steps to modernize its defence capacities and has made progress in the acquisition of up to 12 new submarines, which will improve undetected surveillance capabilities and enhance Ottawa’s sovereignty enforcement. The wheels of procurement, however, move slowly, and it is unclear how many submarines Canada will have in the next decade. As a result, it is necessary for Ottawa to seek operational clarity with its North Sea allies to expressly coordinate against the security threat of the shadow fleet. This can be viewed in essence as a sub-committee of the shadow fleet task force, designed to think ahead of the operational constraints derived from jurisdictional divisions and vessel ambiguity. Publicly creating response structures between allies will illuminate the grey zone that Russia shrouds its hybrid activity in, leaving Canada prepared rather than vulnerable to changing maritime threats.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
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