Introduction
Mis- and disinformation threats ranked second among the Global Risk Report’s short-term risks in 2026, following rapid growth in organized social-media manipulation since 2017. Electoral disinformation poses a unique threat to electoral integrity because it can erode public trust in both the electoral process and democratic institutions. This raises a broader question: what are the conditions that make disinformation campaigns effective, and ultimately successful? Romania’s annulled first round of the 2024 presidential election is a compelling case of how low media literacy rates and a lack of public trust can make disinformation campaigns more effective in impacting electoral outcomes.
Two conditions, when they coincide, can create a fertile environment for disinformation campaigns to succeed: first, a lack of trust in government institutions, and second, low media literacy rates. Romania, where these two conditions coexist, offers an ideal case study: in the lead-up to the first round of the now-annulled 2024 elections, an effective disinformation narrative was deployed to influence citizens to vote for far-right independent candidate Călin Georgescu. Though the court’s decision was unprecedented, intelligence was released to show evidence of foreign interference and voter manipulation through an extensive TikTok movement. Georgescu’s campaign fabricated comments to sway voter opinions, for example, by setting up fake accounts to flood his opponent’s videos with pro-Georgescu sentiment and portraying him as the “chosen one” to create the illusion of widespread support. The fake comments, combined with the wider TikTok campaign promoting ultranationalist ideas, often relied on emotional manipulation tactics, which could be more effective in environments where the target population holds grievances against their government.
Public Trust
According to an OECD survey, approximately 54% of Romanians report low or no trust in their government, and only 18% trust their political parties, placing the country 10 percentage points below the OECD average. Low public trust stems from factors such as corruption, lack of access to basic services, and the perception of a self-serving government. In Romania, perceptions of the government’s ability to handle complex policy issues and act in the public interest are low, with only 23% of the population believing that the government takes into account its people’s political voice. Romanians finding their institutions untrustworthy and holding grievances towards their government can create an ideal environment for falsehoods to be perpetuated through disinformation campaigns, especially when they employ emotional manipulation tactics.
It is crucial to note that a correlation between low levels of public trust and successful disinformation campaigns does not automatically imply causation; rather, it could create fertile conditions for disinformation campaigns to take hold. In Georgescu’s case, his TikTok campaign succeeded in altering voter behaviours, which, as reported by Romania’s Constitutional Court, “skewed voter perceptions, deprived candidates of equitable opportunities, and violated voters’ rights to make informed choices.” A report published through the Counter Disinformation Network shows how Georgescu’s online campaign gained traction by circumventing TikTok’s rules on political promotion. Without explicitly naming Georgescu, a network of influencers promoted his campaign themes of Romanian neutrality and economic independence through the hashtag “#echilibrușiverticalitate,” meaning “equilibrium and verticality.” When viewers later encountered Georgescu expressing the same ideas, they could see him as a candidate who reflected widespread public sentiment, helping build support for him. The report also identifies spam accounts posing as Georgescu supporters that used his campaign materials and shared content endorsing his platform. Together, these coordinated efforts artificially inflated Georgescu’s online presence, creating the impression that he and the views he championed were far more popular than they actually were. As a result, when Romania’s Constitutional Court annulled the results of the election, it “triggered a new crisis of trust in Romania,” as many saw it as confirmation of their existing distrust in the government.
Media literacy
When citizens are media literate, they can better discern how political forms of information are created, and how they can be influenced by biases that affect the way news is produced and disseminated. Low media literacy rates, therefore, could mean greater susceptibility to disinformation that preys on vulnerabilities. Although the average household internet connectivity in Romania is 95.4%, the country ranks last in the EU for “the share of people with at least basic digital skills.”
To demonstrate the role media literacy plays in disinformation campaigns, we can draw a comparison to Lithuania. According to the Media Literacy Index, Lithuania ranks 18th, in comparison to Romania, which ranks 28th out of 35 countries in the index. As a result of a comprehensive and holistic governmental approach to combatting disinformation, such as the Information Literacy Framework Programme and the promotion of media literacy and online safety through training, Lithuanians are more resilient to disinformation threats. This was demonstrated when a Belarusian Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference operation was discovered during the 2024 Lithuanian Presidential elections. No evidence of voters being swayed by the disinformation campaign was found, which could be attributed to a multi-pillar resilience strategy of increasing media monitoring and strategic communication capabilities, promoting media literacy awareness, and raising initiatives to increase societal and institutional resilience. Conversely, in Romania, resilience to disinformation is low, and the population has internalized conspiracist narratives, making them further susceptible to similar disinformation campaigns.
Policy Recommendations
One of NATO’s most effective tools for combating disinformation campaigns that threaten democratic integrity is education. Canada currently has two policies to combat disinformation threats: monitoring the information space through the Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), and raising awareness on the international stage. While these efforts are honourable, they are limited unless they address the root of the issue; otherwise, NATO members will remain in a reactive cycle. To better counter disinformation, Canada and NATO should adopt pre-emptive policies that target the core issues that make a society susceptible to disinformation threats, such as programmes that teach media literacy and equip citizens with the knowledge to combat online disinformation campaigns.
For instance, Lithuania’s 2022 National Programme for Media and Information Literacy Education (MIRKT), administered by the Ministry of Culture through the public library network, had a major impact on media literacy rates throughout the country, where it offered citizens the ability to critically evaluate information online. By 2023, over 1,000 library specialists across 65 regional and municipal libraries received training to become media-literacy educators. The programme has now been adopted into the government’s National Agenda for Training Citizens for Civil Resistance.
Another effort to strengthen media literacy was the Escape Disinfo project, which educated children in grades 6 to 12 through 90-minute sessions in which students had to solve tasks, puzzles, and riddles on resilience to disinformation, fake news and propaganda. Over 60 Escape Disinfo projects were rolled out across schools in Lithuania, with 1,300 students participating. 85% of the students and 98% of teachers involved “indicated they had gained new skills and knowledge in media literacy.”
Similar measures should be adopted across Canadian schools and public library networks, with education programmes administered to teach citizens how to identify disinformation, and, most importantly, not be swayed by threats that seek to undermine electoral integrity. These initiatives are essential for educating future generations about internet safety and media literacy, and equipping them with the tools to recognize and respond to disinformation threats, especially as AI-generated content becomes increasingly sophisticated and widespread.
Photo: “TikTok app icon on a mobile phone” (2020), by Solen Feyissa via Wikimedia. Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
