On June 4, 2026, Prime Minister Mark Carney announced Canada’s national artificial intelligence strategy, “AI for All,” at Toronto General Hospital. In his speech, the Prime Minister emphasized that achieving Canadian AI sovereignty, the ability to govern and deploy AI systems in accordance with Canadian laws and values, is a national priority. Yet, despite possessing world-class talent and one of the fastest-growing digital sectors, Canada remains among the slowest countries to adopt AI at scale. Bridging this gap requires infrastructure that securely supports AI systems and protects Canadian data. Data centres sit at the centre of this challenge, serving as critical foundations for both technological sovereignty and digital security. Because of their growing strategic importance, debates surrounding data centres are increasingly vulnerable to foreign influence campaigns aimed at undermining the support necessary for Canada’s digital infrastructure. By keeping Canada reliant on foreign-controlled digital infrastructure, foreign actors can preserve their strategic influence, increasing Canada’s vulnerability to geopolitical pressure.
Data centres form the physical foundation of cloud computing, providing the storage and services relied upon by software firms, telecommunications networks, businesses and public institutions. Canada currently has 309 data centres. Most are privately owned, with a small number belonging to the federal government. Canadian companies own roughly two-thirds of the country’s privately-owned data centres, while American firms own most of the remaining facilities, making the United States the largest foreign presence in Canada’s data centre sector, alongside companies from France, the United Kingdom, Australia, Austria, the Netherlands and Singapore.
Physical location, however, is only part of the story. The challenge is not simply where data centres are located, but who controls the cloud services that process and manage the information stored within them. In practice, this responsibility falls largely to cloud service providers, or CSPs. In simple terms, CSPs operate much like the electricity providers we have for our homes: rather than generating the power ourselves, organizations purchase cloud computing services from external service providers. In Canada, roughly 60 percent of cloud capacity is controlled by three major American hyperscalers: Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure and Google Cloud. Combined, they account for approximately 85% of the public cloud market share, highlighting Canada’s limited position within the sector.
This concentration of American CSPs creates a significant vulnerability for Canada. While Canadian data is physically stored within its borders, as long as the CSPs employed remain subject to foreign legal jurisdictions, Canada cannot exercise full control over information stored in the cloud. The U.S. CLOUD Act of 2018 illustrates this challenge: it allows American authorities to compel U.S.-based CSPs to provide access to data regardless of where it is physically stored. This creates direct legal exposure for Canadian organizations and could enable access to Canadian data without the knowledge or consent of Canadian authorities. This concern is not theoretical: in June 2025, a senior Microsoft executive told the French Senate he could not guarantee that data stored in France would never be transferred to American authorities. The same reality applies to Canadian data held by foreign CSPs. Especially for Canadian sectors such as healthcare, finance, and government that contain sensitive information, such as personal health data and financial records, the use of foreign CSP’s risks exposing critical data beyond Canadian judicial oversight.
Consequently, foreign access to Canadian data creates real risks for privacy, security, and national sovereignty. Canada’s dependency creates more than regulatory challenges; it also undermines public confidence in the security and integrity of the digital infrastructure that is intended to protect Canada’s most confidential information. That erosion creates fertile ground for coordinated disinformation campaigns that cast doubt on Canada’s ability to strengthen its digital sovereignty through domestic infrastructure. Foreign influence operations are proactive in fracturing public opinion to erode trust in domestic institutions, undercutting government efforts to address citizens’ concerns, thereby preserving the vulnerabilities that can be exploited for strategic advantage. This is what makes public debate surrounding data centre expansion strategically significant. By intensifying existing disagreements, these campaigns can erode public support for the data centre infrastructure intended to reduce Canada’s dependence on foreign CSPs, extending Canada’s reliance on externally controlled systems and prolonging the very vulnerabilities those projects are intended to address. If adversarial actors can successfully weaken public support for data centre expansion through disinformation campaigns, they can slow Canada’s ability to reduce its reliance on foreign CSPs.
One area particularly susceptible to this type of manipulation is environmental and community concerns, since data centres’ high-performance servers require substantial amounts of electricity and water. Data centres typically range from 20,000 to 100,000 square feet, while hyperscalers exceed 1,000,000 square feet. Roughly half of their energy consumption is dedicated to powering servers, while cooling systems account for another 40 percent. Concerns also include greenhouse gas emissions, noise pollution, and the potential impact on the affordability of resources such as electricity and water for local communities. Yet while these criticisms are legitimate, they can become subject to exploitation by foreign actors seeking to exaggerate and amplify existing tensions. Canadian facilities have adopted measures such as waste heat recovery technologies and closed-loop cooling systems to improve efficiency and lower emissions. Despite these efforts, public understanding of data centres and the measures adopted to mitigate their impacts remains limited. This uncertainty is precisely what makes data centres vulnerable to disinformation campaigns: foreign actors build upon divisive topics to inflame public opinion. In practice, this could include amplifying narratives that the Canadian government cannot adequately protect citizens’ data, exaggerating environmental or economic harms, or framing AI infrastructure as inherently harmful to society.
This matters because data centres sit at the intersection of economic, environmental, technological, and security considerations, representing strategically significant infrastructure that underpins critical services across the Canadian economy. Disruption to these systems, whether through cyberattacks, sabotage, or delays to their development, can create a ripple effect that undermines Canada’s efforts to reduce reliance on foreign infrastructure. When countries lack self-sufficiency in critical sectors, they become exposed to external influence and geopolitical pressure. In this respect, disinformation campaigns can weaponize existing anxieties to slow Canada’s progress toward greater AI and data sovereignty. By weakening public support for domestic digital infrastructure and suppressing the benefits that come with greater technological independence, such efforts can impact Canada’s competitiveness and reinforce existing dependencies. NATO increasingly recognizes that secure digital infrastructure, trusted information systems, and resilience against cyber and information operations are essential components of collective defence. Weakness in one nation’s data and cyber ecosystem can expose vulnerabilities that affect allies as well, making secure data storage and governance a shared strategic concern.
Ultimately, economic strength is geopolitical leverage, and maintaining Canada’s reliance on foreign-controlled infrastructure does not align with today’s global realities. The disinformation tactics explored in this article reflect well-documented methods used by foreign actors to shape public narratives around strategically significant infrastructure and policy debates. As data centres become central to Canada’s AI future, public discussions must remain informed, transparent and resilient against manipulation. Recognizing this possibility does not diminish the legitimacy of genuine data centre concerns; rather, it highlights the importance of addressing them through evidence-based discussion and trustworthy public engagement. Achieving data sovereignty requires reducing dependence on foreign-owned cloud infrastructure to strengthen both Canadian national resilience and allied security.
Photo: “Data Centre in Coleraine” (2024), by Geoffrey Moffett via Unsplash. Licensed under the Unsplash License.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
