Society, Culture, and Security Tristan Price

A Third Nuclear Age: Russia’s Role in Nuclear Proliferation Since the Invasion of Ukraine


At a Royal United Services Institute event in December 2024, the head of the UK military, Admiral Sir Tony Radakin, claimed that the world could be on the brink of a “third nuclear age”. Nuclear weapon proliferation is on the rise, largely driven by the Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is important to identify the risks posed by Russia and its allies so that NATO members and other states can properly respond to ensure international security and prevent nuclear proliferation.

Admiral Radakin explained that the first nuclear age can be viewed as the Cold War when the Warsaw Pact and NATO competed against each other, with the risk of nuclear war hanging in the balance. The second nuclear age was marked by non-proliferation efforts following the collapse of the Soviet Union.

A potential third nuclear age hasn’t happened yet, but its risks are becoming increasingly evident. It may be marked by Russia, which is more willing to consider leveraging its nuclear weapons as tools of both hard and soft power internationally. Moreover, it may also be defined by the legacy of Russia’s violation of the Budapest Memorandum, the effects of which could shift the narrative of deterrence away from international cooperation towards nuclear options.

The violation of the Budapest Memorandum by Russia may be the largest turning point in bringing about this new nuclear era. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, many former USSR states, including Ukraine, had large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. To help with non-proliferation in these newly independent countries, Russia alongside other states entered into the Budapest Memorandum. These political agreements allowed for the removal of all nuclear weapons from Ukraine in exchange for assistance and defence guarantees from the US, the UK, and Russia.

The annexation of Crimea and Russia’s blatant invasion of Ukraine represent clear violations of the Budapest Memorandum. The Memorandum was more than just a treaty, it was the embodiment of the idea that international peace and security could be maintained through international cooperation and that nuclear weapons were not the answer to deterrence.

This scenario, where a state gives up nuclear weapons only to be invaded, may prompt other countries to consider developing nuclear weapons and encourage those with nuclear arsenals never to give them up. Ukraine, as the country that suffered the betrayal, has suggested that there can only be two options to ensure its security: joining NATO or developing nuclear weapons. According to a poll published by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology on December 23, 2024, 73% of Ukrainians support nuclear deterrence with only 20% opposed to it. If this narrative gains traction, we may see an increase in the number of proponents of nuclear weapons for national defence.

However, it is not just the violation of the Budapest Memorandum that is driving nuclear proliferation. Since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia has introduced many changes to its nuclear policy. It positioned nuclear weapons in Belarus, suspended its participation in the New START treaty, left the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, and changed its nuclear doctrine lowering the threshold for a nuclear strike.

These changes suggest a shift from international cooperation on nuclear non-proliferation to nuclear ‘saber-rattling’ against NATO and its allies. Russia has sought to intimidate the West from acting against the Kremlin’s interests. This increasing use of hard power tactics with nuclear weapons harkens back to the first nuclear age and the Cold War.

Furthermore, in recent years, Russia has developed closer cooperation with states like Iran and North Korea. Iran has supported Russia with drones and missiles, and North Korea has transferred rockets, artillery systems, and artillery shells, and even provided manpower. This support has been crucial to Russian efforts to gain an advantage over Ukraine.

An important factor is that both North Korea and Iran have nuclear ambitions, and their growing proximity to Russia may be motivated by its nuclear capabilities. Iran may pursue the development and production of nuclear weapons, and North Korea seeks to improve its nuclear weapons technology.

Russia’s permanent position at the UN Security Council can also be leveraged by vetoing resolutions that go against its allies. This is particularly beneficial for states that often face international condemnation over their nuclear ambitions. These forms of nuclear-related soft power are important issues that center Russia as the main actor in the rise of proliferation globally.

The possibility of a third nuclear age is not the fault of Russia alone, but its actions have been key to bringing the world to this point. Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine and violation of the Budapest Memorandum, changes in nuclear policy, and increasing cooperation with states like Iran and North Korea, increase the risk of nuclear weapon proliferation. NATO and other global actors will have to adapt to this situation to avert a potential third nuclear age and prevent further nuclear proliferation.


Photo: AI-generated image. Imagen 3, Google Gemini.

Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.

Author

  • Tristan Price is an undergraduate student at Carleton University pursuing a BA in Global and International Studies with a specialization in global law and social justice. Tristan founded the Carleton Military and Defence Society at Carleton University, and he is also the Oceania editor for the Carleton Global Review. As Engagement Coordinator at the NATO Association of Canada, he hopes to bring people together to engage in academic discussions on key issues and topics related to NATO. You can contact Tristan at tristanscottprice@hotmail.com

    View all posts
Tristan Price
Tristan Price is an undergraduate student at Carleton University pursuing a BA in Global and International Studies with a specialization in global law and social justice. Tristan founded the Carleton Military and Defence Society at Carleton University, and he is also the Oceania editor for the Carleton Global Review. As Engagement Coordinator at the NATO Association of Canada, he hopes to bring people together to engage in academic discussions on key issues and topics related to NATO. You can contact Tristan at tristanscottprice@hotmail.com