The use of election technologies in Canadian municipal elections is increasing. In Ontario alone, the use of internet voting (in conjunction with other voting methods) increased by 14 percentage points since 2022, with approximately 66% of Ontario municipalities offering internet voting. According to a Municipal Security Assessment Report by Goodman et al., the introduction of election technologies including online voting, e-poll books, and electronic tabulators, have contributed to increased voter participation, improved equity and inclusiveness in the voting process, shorter wait times, more efficient tabulation, and improved accessibility. Since its initial introduction in 2011, Alberta, BC, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Ontario, and Quebec have introduced various forms of electronic voting. While most Canadians generally trust the electoral process, with 86% of Canadians expressing a high level of trust in the recent federal election, Canadians remain skeptical towards online voting, with the majority viewing it as risky. Canada can strengthen online election security by adopting lessons from both Estonia and Germany. By drawing on Estonia’s approach to secure election digitization and verifiability, and Germany’s emphasis on electoral transparency, Canada can strengthen its online election security and foster greater public trust in the digital voting process.
To date, online voting methods are more widely used in Canadian municipal elections than in provincial and federal elections. One area in which Canadian municipalities could strengthen online election security is voter authentication. Currently, date of birth (DOB) remains a popular login authentication method used by Ontario municipalities that have adopted online voting.This method poses several security risks, including the potential for re-identification, whereby a ballot could be linked with the identity of the voter who cast it. Additionally, DOB information is neither difficult to obtain nor secret. In Estonia, citizens possess a digital ID card that is used for online voting methods. When voting online, the ID card is scanned by an ID card reader, and voters can vote on their computers.Voters can also use a mobile ID, which would not require a physical card reader to verify their identity. Implementing a more secure and reliable means of identification could increase the confidence in elections using online voting technologies. While this method of voter verification does introduce other cybersecurity and potential societal consequences, it is more reliable than the use of DOBs.
Photo: “New Estonian ID card (front)” (2021), by Government of Estonia via Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.
While the online ID verification process is not perfect and risks introducing other security or societal consequences, adopting a similar verification process to online voting in Canada could be a significant step in the right direction. A more robust verification process coupled with increased electoral transparency could improve the security and accessibility of online voting, particularly for voters who may benefit from alternative voting methods. Greater transparency in the online election process – for example, the determination of votes – could also help address concerns regarding the integrity of online voting and contribute to improved perceptions of trust in the Canadian electoral system.
In a landmark 2009 ruling, the German Federal Constitutional Court found that the use of certain electronic voting machines in the 2005 Bundestag election failed to satisfy this requirement. The Court emphasized that voters must be able to verify the essential stages of an election without relying on specialized technical knowledge. In essence, election procedures cannot be designed so that their validity can only be verified by persons with specialized technical knowledge. The essential steps of an election must be capable of being understood and verified by the public without requiring specialized expertise. Its concerns included the ability of the public to scrutinize the electoral process, voters’ access to meaningful verification, the complexity of electronic voting systems, and the potential for technical errors or manipulation to undermine confidence in election results. Essentially, under Germany’s federal election procedures, members of the public can observe the election process. Canadian municipalities, for example, use varying election methods and procedures, and online voting can make the counting process less directly observable to the public. Although there are requirements for publishing election results in Canada, adopting stronger independent auditing, verification procedures, and transparent reporting could help ensure that electronic votes are accurately counted and that election results can be trusted. Canada could therefore draw on Germany’s emphasis on public scrutiny to strengthen transparency in online elections.
Estonia’s online system gives the voter technological mechanisms for individual electronic verification, whereas Canada and Germany primarily rely on mechanisms that make the broader electoral process observable and auditable. Unlike Germany, however, Canada has more instances where the use of voting technologies have been introduced in municipal elections. As technologies continue to evolve, it is likely that the use of voting technologies will increase in Canadian elections. As such, it would be useful for Canada to consider adopting a blend of the Estonian and German election models to ensure that elections remain verifiable and transparent, even with increasing use of voting technologies.
Whereas Estonia’s electoral system incorporates electronic authentication and verification, Germany’s constitutional framework places particular emphasis on electoral transparency and the ability of the public to scrutinize the voting process. Canada should consider adopting more robust electronic authentication and verification methods for future online voting options. The Estonian model provides a more robust form of voter authentication than simply using a DOB, while remaining relatively user-friendly.
Furthermore, Canada should aim to strengthen the transparency of online voting by applying the German principle of public verifiability to electronic elections. Rather than relying solely on the security of the voting platform or providing voters with an electronic confirmation that their ballot was recorded, online voting systems could be designed so that voting and vote counting are independently auditable and verifiable by voters, candidates, and election observers. This level of transparency could help to quell future concerns among voters regarding election integrity and online voting methods.
By incorporating elements of both models, Canada can strengthen the security and verifiability of online voting while maintaining accessibility and convenience for voters. Ultimately, adopting more robust authentication methods and greater transparency in the online voting process could help address security concerns and foster greater public confidence in Canada’s increasingly digital electoral system.
Cover Photo: “Elections Canada polling station 2015” (2015), by Ishmael N. Daro via Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
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