By Daniel Lincoln
The modern Indo-Pacific is witnessing assertions of strategic autonomy that challenge classical geopolitical logics and patterns of great power competition. During the 2025 Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, regional leaders signaled that they will not be corralled into binary agreements amid intensifying US-China rivalry. The forum revealed a fundamental rejection of zero-sum superpower competition in favour of the interests-based pragmatism preferred by Indo-Pacific states.
This posture recalls aspects of the Cold War era Non-Alignment Movement, when many states similarly sought space between rival blocs. Today’s non-alignment is newer in scale and agency but not entirely novel; however, unlike in the Cold War, tectonic shifts in the global geoeconomic landscape amid the dynamics of increasing globalization have empowered states to pursue strategic autonomy more effectively than their predecessors in the 20th century.
The binaries of a US-led order opposing a China-led bloc are giving way to strategic pluralism, with overlapping coalitions, layered partnerships, and flexible rules privileging agency over alignment. Rather than picking sides, Indo-Pacific countries are pursuing diverse relationships tailored to their national interests and constraints. The region’s message to external powers is clear: it seeks multi-vector foreign policies and will resist efforts to lock it into exclusive blocs.
Recent diplomatic trends in Southeast Asia illustrate this emerging ethos. As ASEAN chair, Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim emphasized at the 2025 Shangri La Dialogue that economic stability is inseparable from security, warning that trade disruption, not military conflict, is the primary concern for many regional states. Signaling that a premium is placed on economic relations with all powers, Singapore’s leaders echoed that Southeast Asia “rejects zero-sum thinking” and instead favours multilateral cooperation, highlighting the bloc’s determination to “shape its own destiny.”
This reality is increasingly recognized by external actors. In his 2025 Shangri-La remarks, French President Emmanuel Macron rejected portrayals of the Indo-Pacific as a Cold War-esque battleground. Instead, he called for strategic autonomy as a guiding principle, presenting a “third way” for states caught between Washington and Beijing. His words resonated precisely because they reflected the agency Indo-Pacific governments increasingly both demand and actively exercise: the freedom to define their own alignments on a case-by-case basis.
Beyond rhetoric, this approach has seen concrete outcomes. ASEAN reinforced its strategic centrality by elevating Canada to Strategic Partner status in 2023, broadening ties and ensuring diverse partnerships. By contrast, NATO’s efforts to plant a flag in the region have met mixed responses. Plans for a NATO liaison office in Tokyo were shelved in 2023, exposing both internal divisions and external skepticism. Likewise, most leaders of NATO’s four Asia-Pacific partners (Japan, South Korea, Australia, and New Zealand) skipped NATO’s 2025 summit in The Hague. Their absence suggested that cross-regional ties are not yet fully reciprocated, with regional priorities – particularly the management of China’s rise – taking precedence.
In totality, these developments demonstrate a durable pattern of agency rather than alignment, echoing the philosophy of the earlier Non-Aligned Movement, albeit built on a much stronger economic foundation. The Indo-Pacific is sending a clear message that it will not be confined to a simplistic East-West divide, and NATO must adjust accordingly if it seeks regional relevance.
The Cold War logic of bloc alignment as applied to the modern Indo-Pacific is defunct. During the Cold War, smaller states, despite their occasional stated objections, often felt compelled to choose between Washington and Moscow largely due to the particularities of the global economy in that era. Today, however, Indo-Pacific nations wield far greater economic clout and confidence, enabling them to resist external pressure from all sides.
The region already accounts for more than one-third of global output and is projected to represent over half of global GDP by 2040. By 2030, two-thirds of the global middle class will live there. Three of the world’s largest economies – China, India, and Japan – anchor the region. This economic empowerment provides Indo-Pacific states with leverage and resilience, which is only amplified by the region’s deep integration in crucial global supply chains. They can diversify partnerships, reduce dependence on any single power, and shield themselves from coercion by playing multiple powers against one another.
This stands in sharp contrast to the Cold War, when many Global South states relied on superpower patronage for aid, trade, investment, and security guarantees. Then, economic weakness often compelled alignment. Now, economic strength enables autonomy. Countries like Vietnam, Indonesia, and India can pursue ambitious development strategies while refusing to sign up for exclusive blocs, picking and choosing engagement with external powers on their own terms.
Many regional governments also view over-securitized alignment as counterproductive. When Washington recently urged Indo-Pacific partners to spend up to 5% of GDP on defence, using NATO benchmarks, it was met with little enthusiasm. For most Asian states, national security is inseparable from continued economic growth. The multifarious and significant costs of rigid alignment – lost trade, public opposition, or becoming a target in great power rivalry – are too high. Instead, states hedge, engaging selectively with external powers where mutual interests converge, but remaining cognizant of red lines that can lead to diplomatic alienation.
For NATO, accustomed to unity against geopolitical adversaries, these dynamics are disorienting. The Indo-Pacific’s emerging strategic architecture is fluid, multipolar, and institutionally diverse: ad-hoc coalitions, minilateral groupings, and ASEAN’s commitment to neutrality all resist bloc politics. India’s “multi-aligned” foreign policy and South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy further formalize this ethos. As a result, any effort to construct an “Asian NATO” or overtly anti-China bloc would likely be rejected outright.
If NATO wishes to remain relevant in the Indo-Pacific, it must craft a strategy rooted in constructive, pragmatic engagement rather than ideological competition. NATO’s Strategic Concept now acknowledges that Indo-Pacific developments affect Euro-Atlantic security, but success requires aligning with emergent regional realities and preferences.
Learning from the Cold War’s Non-Aligned Movement, NATO should approach today’s Indo-Pacific states as autonomous actors whose cooperation must be earned through inclusive, non-exclusive partnerships, not bloc discipline. The objective should be to support stability and the rules-based order without forcing binary choices. Key pillars of a recalibrated NATO approach could include the following.
NATO can strengthen its influence and credibility in Asia by supporting ASEAN-led forums, aligning naval and security activities with regional exercises, and endorsing ASEAN’s inclusive Indo-Pacific outlook rather than creating exclusive clubs. Supporting ASEAN-led forums – such as the ASEAN Regional Forum and the East Asia Summit – shows respect for the region’s own priorities. Many NATO members are already ASEAN dialogue partners; coordinating efforts at the Alliance level would amplify their impact. Naval visits, training, or security dialogues should be undertaken in concert with multilateral exercises hosted in Asia, not as NATO-branded displays of power. Endorsing ASEAN’s Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which emphasizes openness and stability, would signal that NATO seeks to reinforce – not supplant – the region’s existing order.
NATO should focus on cooperative maritime security by sharing naval expertise, building local capacities, and emphasizing humanitarian and non-traditional missions to protect vital sea lanes. Secure maritime passages are essential for the global economy, and maritime security is one area where NATO’s contributions would be welcomed. Piracy, illegal fishing, and trafficking undermine regional – and global – prosperity. NATO allies can share naval expertise, help build capacity for local coast guards, and support freedom of navigation operations when conducted in collaboration. A dedicated NATO maritime initiative could emphasize humanitarian missions, disaster-response training, and joint patrols focused on non-traditional threats. By working with rather than over regional partners, NATO could add value without inflaming pre-existing territorial disputes.
NATO can build trust and show its relevance beyond geopolitics by working with the Indo-Pacific on climate adaptation, disaster response, and humanitarian assistance. The Indo-Pacific is one of the world’s most climate-vulnerable regions. Frequent cyclones, floods, and rising seas pose existential challenges. Here, NATO can build trust by focusing on shared, non-adversarial threats. Its civil-military coordination in disaster response, combined with research from its climate-security centres of excellence, offers a strong foundation for collaboration. By engaging in humanitarian assistance and climate adaptation, NATO demonstrates relevance beyond geopolitics and strengthens perceptions of the Alliance as a contributor to human security.
By investing in training and capacity-building to empower regional partners, NATO can further boost its credibility. Rather than stationing large forces in Asia, NATO’s credibility can rest on enabling local partners. Training programmes could target cyber defence, counterterrorism, maritime domain awareness, and military medicine. The Alliance’s experience in engaging with external powers provides meaningful models that could be adapted for the Indo-Pacific. These initiatives would empower partners to provide for their own security, aligning with their preference for autonomy while enhancing interoperability with NATO standards.
Through leveraging trusted member states, NATO can effectively strengthen its Indo-Pacific mission. NATO members with strong reputations in the Indo-Pacific should lead the way. Canada stands out as a Pacific nation with relatively little historic baggage, with Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific approach emphasizing trade, development, and human security alongside defence. By spotlighting Canada’s regional projects, backing its bids to join Asian security dialogues, and integrating its initiatives into NATO’s broader engagement, the Alliance can build credibility. Similar roles could be played by France and the UK, both of which extensively champion Indo-Pacific engagements.
The Indo-Pacific’s agency, economic pragmatism, and flexible partnerships define the regional order, not ideological faultlines. NATO’s future relevance in this crucial region depends on adapting to this reality. The Alliance must move beyond Cold War paradigms toward an engagement strategy that emphasizes listening, supporting, and cooperating.
This means treating Indo-Pacific states not as pawns in a great power contest but as equal stakeholders in shaping a stable regional order. A NATO that contributes to multilateral solutions, strengthens local capacity, and addresses common non-traditional challenges will find willing collaborators. A NATO that exports bloc mentality will be sidelined. The experience of past non-aligned states demonstrates that inclusive, issue-based cooperation endures far longer than attempts at rigid bloc-building.
Success will not be measured by how many states NATO lines up “on its side”, but by how effectively it integrates into the region’s dense web of partnerships. Within a paradigm where agency over alignment is the guiding principle, NATO must prove it can adapt.
Looking forward, NATO’s Indo-Pacific engagement is not simply about China or maritime flashpoints. It is about whether the Alliance can remain globally relevant in a century where power diffusion and strategic autonomy will be the rule rather than the exception. By focusing on constructive engagement, championing multilateralism, addressing climate and maritime challenges, and supporting regional autonomy, NATO can help uphold the rules-based order while respecting the independence of Indo-Pacific states. That balance will be essential not just for regional peace and prosperity, but also for the credibility of NATO itself in the decades to come.
Photo by Anton Balazh, Adobe Images
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada
