In December 2025, the Department of National Defence (DND) and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF), under General Jennie Carignan, reportedly began preparing large-scale mobilization scenarios to strengthen force-generation capacity amid a deteriorating global security environment. The CAF’s plans reflect a broader shift among NATO allies toward expanding operational readiness and personnel capacity in response to Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific. Canada’s mobilization ambitions increasingly resemble those of NATO allies preparing for large-scale conflict, however, persistent personnel and training deficiencies raise doubts about whether the CAF can translate strategic objectives into deployable capability.
The 2025 mobilization proposal, if enacted, would significantly expand CAF manpower by augmenting the Regular Force with an additional 85,000 personnel, establishing a supplementary civilian force of approximately 300,000 citizens, and adding another 100,000 personnel to the Reserve Force to improve force-generation capacity and operational readiness.
While section 31 of National Defence Act (NDA) permits the activation of the Reserve Force in order to augment the Regular Force in the following instances: during national emergencies, for the defence of Canada or to fulfill international obligations, in response to national disasters, to aid civil authorities during riots or disturbances of the peace, for mandatory training, periods, or under any other circumstances authorized by the Governor in Council, augmentation will not come without its obstacles. Recruiting, training, and integrating tens of thousands of additional personnel would require substantial financial resources. For years, the CAF has faced training backlogs driven by underfunding and personnel shortages. Although the Government of Canada has already met NATO’s 2% defence spending target in March 2026 and has committed to NATO’s 5% target by 2035, the CAF will still face the dual challenge of clearing existing recruitment and training bottlenecks while simultaneously modernizing and expanding the Reserve Force’s mandate.
The CAF’s mass mobilization announcement followed Canada’s 2023 defence policy, Strong, Secure, Engaged – A New Vision for Canada’s Reserve Force (PDF), which called for fundamental changes to the Reserve Force to support future CAF capability needs. Throughout the document, former Chief of the Defence Staff General Wayne Eyre outlines his vision, which is three-pronged. At the tactical level, the vision is to vacancies in critical functional areas while balancing career aspirations. The operational level leads to the assignment of force-development activities uniquely to Reserve units. Lastly, the strategic level updates existing CAF mobilization directives to rapidly mobilize, train, equip, and deploy the Reserve Force and Supplementary Reserve for late-stage mobilization.
The Reserve Force modernization vision comes as the CAF meets its NATO 2% commitment. However, for decades, the Reserve Force has faced structural and resource constraints, including limited funding, personnel shortages, insufficient training opportunities, and equipment deficiencies.
However, before the CAF can begin addressing the former CDS’s vision, it must resolve its recruitment and training shortfalls. Decades of underspending on Canada’s military have made what should be a straightforward overhaul significantly more difficult. As of October 2025, according to the Office of the Auditor General of Canada (OAG), the CAF’s inability to recruit and train enough new personnel is severely hindering its operational readiness and its ability to respond to threats, emergencies, and conflicts. While nearly 192,000 people applied to the CAF in the 2025–2026 fiscal year, only 1 in 13 applicants completed the recruitment process, resulting in just 15,000 new recruits.
Moreover, a recent Macdonald-Laurier Institute article analyzed a leaked report authored by the Commander of the Canadian Forces Leadership and Recruit School (CFLRS). The report stated that the 2022 changes to entry standards, opening recruitment to permanent residents, removing the aptitude test, and relaxing medical limitations, led to a decline in Basic Military Qualification (BMQ) completion rates, from 85% to 77%. The report argues that recent changes to recruitment standards may have contributed to declining completion rates, although the extent to which these reforms directly caused the decline remains contested.
This raises critical questions about how the CAF can modernize its Reserve Force to remain relevant and operational in 2026. Should the CAF tailor enlistment standards by trade to meet recruiting goals? If the CAF adjusts standards, such as physical fitness requirements, does it risk operational readiness during deployment? Should the CAF increase salaries to compete with private-sector compensation? Is higher pay enough to incentivize individuals to enlist amid heightened geopolitical tensions?
These are the questions the CAF must confront to determine the best path forward. Lowering physical fitness standards may harm operational readiness during large-scale deployments but could help fill in-demand roles, such as naval operators, that do not require the same daily physical demands as infantry positions.
Canada’s NATO counterparts, such as the United Kingdom and Germany, have also adopted approaches aimed at expanding training capacity and addressing personnel shortages through partnerships with civilian institutions and private-sector organizations. Rather than focusing on traditional recruitment strategies alone, these efforts place greater emphasis on institutional adaptability, long-term investment, and leveraging civilian expertise and infrastructure to strengthen broader defence capabilities.
Therefore, the OAG’s recommendation that the CAF invest in training infrastructure, including instructors and equipment, to enable more recruits to be trained simultaneously aligns well with new initiatives undertaken by NATO counterparts. Additionally, it suggested that the CAF address understaffed occupations, particularly those tied to urgent operational requirements.
The first recommendation is reflected in the CAF’s unconventional training partnerships with civilian colleges. In 2024, the CAF expanded training beyond the CFLRS and the Canadian Forces College. It first partnered with Fanshawe College to support military members transitioning into service by generating transferable skills. Most recently, in April 2026, it signed an agreement with Royal Roads University in British Columbia. This program increases officer development capacity by serving as a new ROTP training pathway, allowing individuals to graduate with a bachelor’s degree while incorporating leadership, ethics, fitness, health and wellbeing, and second-language training throughout the program.
This initiative represents a significant step forward for the CAF. If it generates strong enrolment, the pilot project may lead to additional agreements with civilian universities to expand officer-training capacity beyond the Canadian Forces College, potentially reducing training costs through outsourcing.
The second recommendation is already visible to the public. On the CAF recruiting website, applicants are encouraged to apply for in-demand occupations through incentives such as recruiting allowances—essentially sign-up bonuses—and priority application processing.
Taken together, these initiatives show that the CAF is finally moving beyond discussion and beginning to experiment with practical solutions that could meaningfully strengthen the Reserve Force. The combination of targeted recruiting incentives, expanded training capacity, and new partnerships with civilian institutions suggests a system that is adapting—slowly, but deliberately—to the realities of today’s security environment. If the CAF can sustain this momentum, address its recruitment bottlenecks, and continue investing in modern training pathways, the Reserve Force could emerge far more capable and relevant than it has been in decades. The next few years will be critical, but they also present a genuine opportunity for the CAF to build a Reserve that is not only larger, but better trained, more flexible, and more aligned with Canada’s evolving defence needs.
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
