What comes to mind when you think of NATO? For many, it is military conflict or external geopolitical threats. However, security challenges are not confined to the battlefield. In Canada, the ongoing overdose crisis, driven largely by synthetic opioids such as fentanyl, has become a significant domestic security issue.
Drug overdoses do not only affect individuals; they ripple outward, undermining social stability, straining public institutions, and exposing deeper societal vulnerabilities. While the crisis is often framed as transnational, its internal consequences within NATO countries deserves greater attention. In Canada’s case, the overdose crisis highlights a broader gap in NATO’s approach to security, particularly its tendency to underestimate threats that emerge from within member states.
Between January 2016 and September 2025, Canada recorded over 55,000 opioid toxicity deaths, with fentanyl involved in more than half of cases in 2025. Most of these deaths are linked to non-pharmaceutical opioid sources, and tens of thousands of hospitalizations and emergency responses have placed sustained pressure on healthcare systems. In British Columbia, where a public health emergency was declared in 2016, the crisis has remained especially acute, reflecting a structural strain and declining societal resilience. Unlike traditional military threats, the overdose crisis is shaped by socioeconomic and health related factors within a country.
High mortality rates and increased demand for healthcare services weaken institutional capacity and can erode public trust. The economic impact is also significant. Substance use was estimated to cost Canada approximately $49.1 billion in 2020, with nearly half attributed to lost productivity. These losses affect labour force participation and economic stability, both of which are central to national resilience within NATO countries.
The fentanyl trade reflects a complex interaction between global and domestic dynamics. Precursor chemicals are often sourced internationally, particularly from parts of Asia, while domestic production in Canada has expanded with organized crime groups operating clandestine laboratories across multiple provinces. In 2025 alone, the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) seized more than 4,300 litres of precursor chemicals shipped from China to Western Canada. Compounding the issue, roughly 80 percent of the chemicals used in fentanyl production remain unregulated and can be obtained legally, blurring the line between domestic and international security challenges.
Responses to the crisis have been uneven and, at times, highly politicized. The case of Insite, a supervised injection site established in 2003 in Vancouver, illustrates this tension. Evidence shows that such sites reduce overdose deaths, disease transmission, and public disorder, while easing pressure on emergency services. Despite this, they continue to face political resistance and moral debate.
This inconsistency reflects a broader issue across NATO countries: the absence of a coordinated approach to internal, population level threats. Policies such as safe injection sites, decriminalization, and harm reduction vary even within Canada, creating uneven levels of resilience. For example, Vancouver has maintained harm reduction services, while other regions (including parts of Ontario), have scaled them back.
The overdose crisis ultimately challenges conventional definitions of security. Issues such as addiction, marginalization, and exposure to toxic drug supplies originate at the individual level but can scale up to affect national stability. Given the legitimate industrial and commercial uses of many precursor chemicals, fully restricting their availability would be difficult. Instead, stronger monitoring of supply chains, supported by NATO intelligence sharing on transnational organized crime networks, could help identify emerging patterns and shifts in the drug trade.
Addressing these risks requires NATO countries to broaden their understanding of security to include societal resilience. This involves integrating public health, social services, and law enforcement into a more cohesive framework. Although the Alliance has recognized drug trafficking as a transnational issue, less attention has been given to the internal impacts of substance use crises.
There is no single solution. Addressing the overdose crisis requires a balanced approach that targets both supply and demand. Efforts to disrupt supply chains through border enforcement, intelligence sharing, and action against organized crime must be paired with strategies that reduce demand, including improved access to treatment, public education, and harm reduction services. Without such coordination, responses are likely to remain reactive rather than effective.
Canada’s current response reflects a combination of substantial federal action and uneven provincial implementation. One practical step would be to use its role within NATO to promote shared benchmarks for internal security and resilience and then apply similar standards domestically. Establishing minimum national expectations for treatment access, overdose response capacity, and harm reduction services would help reduce disparities between provinces such as British Columbia and Ontario.
At the same time, Canada could strengthen efforts to disrupt illicit opioid supply chains by improving coordination and intelligence-sharing across existing law enforcement, border security, and public safety institutions. Greater integration with NATO-aligned intelligence networks, combined with closer collaboration between the CBSA, international partners, and domestic police services, could enhance the early detection of precursor chemical shipments, illicit financial flows, and transnational organized crime activity linked to synthetic opioid production and trafficking. Canada has already invested approximately $200 million in enhanced intelligence gathering and sharing on fentanyl and organized crime and established a Joint Operational Intelligence Cell to improve coordination. Additional measures include the creation of a precursor chemical risk management unit and roughly $1.3 billion in new investments in border security and expanded CBSA capacity, as well as cooperation with international partners, including China, to limit precursor flows.
However, these efforts remain only partially integrated. Coordination across jurisdictions continues to evolve, and many precursor chemicals used in fentanyl production remain legal or loosely regulated, allowing production networks to adapt. The central challenge is therefore not a lack of action, but a lack of coherence.
By improving coordination, standardizing responses across provinces, and more effectively leveraging international frameworks such as NATO, Canada can move from a fragmented approach toward a more integrated strategy. If these issues remain unaddressed, Canada risks not only failing populations directly affected by the overdose crisis but also placing increasing strain on public systems nationwide. Continued growth of illicit opioid markets also creates opportunities for organized crime networks to expand operations and exploit emerging vulnerabilities within Canada’s borders. Furthermore, if Canada becomes perceived by NATO partners and other allies as a significant node within the international synthetic drug supply chain, it could weaken Canada’s credibility and reputation as a reliable security partner. An inability to effectively manage domestic security and public health challenges may raise broader concerns among allies about Canada’s capacity to respond to more complex international threats and responsibilities.
Image credit: Downtown Eastside, Vancouver during coronavirus pandemic (2020) by GoToVan via Wikimedia Commons. Licensed under CC 2.0
Disclaimer: Any views or opinions expressed in articles are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the NATO Association of Canada.
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